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Abstract
Heckscher-Ohlin versions of the two-sector neoclassical growth model predict
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into the model.
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1 Introduction
Convergence across economies, or the lack of it, is a main research agenda in the eco-
nomic growth literature. The question asked is whether income per capita in poor
countries or regions tends to grow faster than in rich ones. The answer to this ques-
tion has clearly important implications for the expected evolution of welfare levels
in developing nations. The closed-economy neoclassical growth framework helps in
that direction by o¤ering an important insight. It predicts that economies that have
the same fundamentals and only di¤er in the initial capital-labor ratios will eventually
share the same levels of output per capita. This has become the well known conditional
convergence hypothesis.1
Open economy frameworks, however, challenge the above prediction. Among them,
we nd the dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model. First introduced by Oniki and Uzawa
(1965) and Bardhan (1965), it represents a widely used setup to analyze trade and
growth issues that embeds the standard Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade into the neo-
classical growth model. One of its important predictions is that developing countries
that are identical to developed nations in all aspects except for the capital stock level
can remain permanently poorer, as Chen (1992) and Atkeson and Kehoe (2000) show.
This result, besides being in stark contrast to the predictions of closed economy models,
also warns us about the dangers of international trade.
In this paper, we show that the above lack-of-convergence prediction among economies
that share the same technologies and preferences heavily depends on the characteristics
of production inputs. In particular, when land is introduced into the model, interna-
tional trade in goods does not limit the capacity of poor nations to catch up with the
advanced world.2
More specically, we consider a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model similar to Atkeson
and Kehoes (2000); the only di¤erence is the inclusion of a third input, land. The world
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is composed of a large number of small open economies that posses identical preferences
and production technologies. Individuals are innitely lived and make decisions so as
to maximize the discounted value of their future utility stream. Each country has
the production structure of the standard two-sector neoclassical growth model with
consumption and investment goods. All rms, regardless of the sector, employ land,
capital and labor, and have di¤erent input intensities thus meaning that each sector
produces with di¤erent relative input proportions. The two commodities are traded
internationally, but inputs cannot cross borders.
Countries in the model only di¤er in the date when they start the development
process. Some of them, which we call early-bloomers, have already reached their steady
states, while others begin to develop, the late-bloomers. Examples of early-bloomers
would include high income nations such as the U.S., the E.U. economies or Japan.
Examples of late-bloomers could be fast growing Asian, African and Latin-American
countries such as China, Mozambique and Brazil. In terms of the model, the distinction
simply implies that late-bloomers posses a capital-labor ratio that is below the steady-
state level of the early-bloomers; this could occur, for example, if late-bloomers adopt
the early-bloomers institutions and enjoy a sudden increase in total factor productivity.
It is the property that land is an input in xed supply that causes our main re-
sult that income levels of identical late-blooming and early-blooming nations always
converge. More specically, in the more standard two-sector model without land, in-
ternational trade allows a developing nation end up relatively specialized in the less
capital-intensive sector. This outcome occurs because as soon as the economys cap-
ital stock is enough to make the return to capital converge to the one of the rest of
the world, the developing nation stops converging. But with the less capital intensive
sector dominating production, the late-blooming country remains permanently poorer.
However, because land is in xed supply, only one pair of labor allocations and, there-
fore, one capital-labor ratio can accommodate the long-run rental rate on capital in
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our framework, thus making di¤erences in steady-state income levels between identical
economies impossible.
Our result then rests on the equalization of steady-state interest rates across economies.
This happens even though the model presents a Heckscher-Ohlin structure with two
goods and three inputs, and so the Factor Price Equalization Theorem (Samuelson
1948 and 1949) does not hold. Two comments are in order here. First of all, factor
price equalization is a feature of the steady state because the innite horizon structure
implies that the interest rate along the balanced growth path is exclusively pinned
down by preferences, which eliminates the degree of freedom in factor prices. Second
of all, outside the steady state, the model does not predict factor price equalization;
during the transition, factor prices vary with the physical capital stock.
Other papers that use multi-sector models of international trade and growth include
Ventura (1997), Mountford (1998), Galor and Mountford (2006, 2008), Guilló and
Perez-Sebastian (2007), and Bajona and Kehoe (2010). Although none of them focus
on whether the timing of development matters for convergence, one of the results in
Bajona and Kehoe is related to our ndings. They show that, for a given elasticity
of substitution between traded goods, convergence in relative incomes depends on the
pattern of trade over time. In our model two small economies that have the same land
endowment will end up having the same long run income independently of their trade
patterns along the adjustment path.
2 The Economy
Consider a world economy consisting of a large number of small open economies that
share the same preferences and production technologies, but can di¤er in the input
endowment. There are two goods, and three factors of production. As in Oniki and
Uzawa (1965), the economy manufactures consumption and investment goods. Pro-
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duction of these good needs capital, labor and land inputs, which can freely move
across sectors. For concreteness, we assume that consumption-goods production is less
capital intensive and more land intensive than the investment sector.3 There is free
trade in goods, but international movements of inputs are prohibited. All markets are
perfectly competitive. Population is constant and its size equals L in each nation.
2.1 Consumers
The economy is populated by Innitely-lived agents that discount future utility with the
factor , and have preferences only over consumption. In particular, their preferences
are given by
1X
t=0
t

c1 t   1
1  

;  2 (0; 1) ;  > 0: (1)
Individuals o¤er labor services and rent capital and land to rms. The total amount of
land in the economy is xed over time, equals N , and is uniformly distributed across
all individuals. Since in each period international trade must be balanced, consumers
in each country face the following budget constraint
ct + ptxt = rktkt + rntnt + wt; (2)
where the evolution of capital is governed by
kt+1 = (1  ) kt + xt: (3)
In the above expressions, ct is the per capita demand for consumption goods; xt is the
per capita demand for investment goods; rkt, rnt, and wt are the rental rates on capital,
land, and labor, respectively; nt and kt denote the amount of the natural input and
capital owned by the individual at date t. The consumption good is the numeraire,
and pt gives the price of the investment product.
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Consumers in each country will maximize (1) subject to (2) and (3), taking as given
the world output prices and the domestic rental rates for production factors. The Euler
equation corresponding to this dynamic programing problem is standard:
ct+1
ct
=

pt+1
pt


rkt+1
pt+1
+ 1  
1=
: (4)
It says that the growth rate of consumption depends on the present-utility value of the
rate of return to saving. This return reects that giving up a unit of present consump-
tion allows buying 1=pt units of the investment good today that, after contributing to
the production process, will covert themselves tomorrow in (1 + rkt+1=pt+1   ) units
that can be sold at a price pt+1.
2.2 Firms
In each nation, a su¢ ciently large number of prot-maximizing rms manufacture
the consumption good (Yct) and the investment good (Yxt) employing the following
technologies:
Yct = AK

ctN

ctL
1  
ct = ALctk

ctn

ct; ;  2 (0; 1) : (5)
Yxt = BK

xtN

xtL
1 
xt = BLxtk

xtn

xt; ;  2 (0; 1) : (6)
Above, Kit, Nit and Lit denote, respectively, the amount of capital and labor devoted
in period t to the production of good i; and nit = Nit=Lit, kit = Kit=Lit, for all i = c; x.
Production of c-goods is less capital intensive but more land intensive. Which means
that c-products are manufactured employing a lower capital-labor ratio but a higher
land-labor ratio than investment goods. In order to ensure this asymmetry in factor
proportions, we need to assume that  (1  ) >  (1  ) and  (1  ) <  (1  ).
Firms in each country will maximize prots taking as given world prices and the
domestic rental rates on production factors. From the production functions (5) and
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(6), production e¢ ciency implies that
rkt = Ak
 1
ct n

ct = ptBk
 1
xt n

xt; (7)
rnt = Ak

ctn
 1
ct = ptBk

xtn
 1
xt ; (8)
wt = (1    )Akctnct = (1     ) ptBkxtnxt: (9)
Of course, these equalities will hold only for the technologies that coexist in equi-
librium. More specically, domestic rms will produce both goods if the international
price pt is in the interval
 
pmint ; p
max
t

. If investment goods are too cheap, pt  pmint , the
economy will specialize in the production of consumption goods; whereas if x-products
are su¢ ciently expensive, pt  pmaxt , consumption goods will not be manufactured. It
is easy to show that the minimum and maximum price that dene this diversication
interval are, respectively:4
pmint =
A
B


 

 
1    
1     
1  
k t n
  (10)
pmaxt =
A
B




 
1    
1     
1  
k t n
  (11)
These threshold prices depend on the nations per capita endowments of capital and
land; hence, we can write them as pmin(kt;n) and pmax(kt;n).
Let us focus on the diversied-production equilibrium, and dene the relative factor
prices !kt = wt=rkt and !nt = wt=rnt: The e¢ ciency conditions in production (7) and
(9) determine the optimal allocations of capital as a function of the relative factor
price:
kxt =


1     

!kt; (12)
kct =


1    

!kt: (13)
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Similarly, (8) and (9) imply that
nxt =


1     

!nt; (14)
nct =


1    

!nt: (15)
Hence, the assumptions that  (1  ) >  (1  ) and  (1  ) <  (1  ) ensure
that kxt > kxct and nxt < nct, respectively.
2.3 Trade, market clearing and income per capita
Dene Ezt as net exports of z-goods at date t. Commodity trade between countries is
free, and requires that in each economy the following equalities hold:
Yct = ctL+ Ect; (16)
and
Yxt = xtL+ Ext: (17)
In addition, balanced trade implies that the (absolute) value of net exports must be
the same for the two goods but with opposite signs; that is,
Ect =  ptExt: (18)
Let us denote the labor share in the production of good i by lit = Lit=L: Notice that
because consumers are alike, the amount of capital and land owned by each individual
will equal the countrys capital-labor and land-labor ratios, respectively. Hence, the
constraints on labor, capital and land within a region can be written as follows:
lct + lxt = 1; (19)
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lctkct + lxtkxt = kt: (20)
lctnct + lxtnxt = n (21)
We are now ready to derive two main expressions in our analyses. Both refer
to economies that show diversied production, that is, economies for which pt 2 
pmint ; p
max
t

. Using technologies (5) and (6), along with FOC (9) and market clear-
ing condition (19), we can write a nations GDP level per capita as
yt = lctyct + ptlxtyxt =
wt
1     

1 + lct

+       
1    

; (22)
where yct = Yct=Lct, and yxt = Yxt=Lxt. Conditions (7), and (12) to (15), in turn,
provide the next expression for the price of investment goods:
pt =
A
B




 
1    
1     
1  
k xt n
 
xt : (23)
Notice that all the above expressions apply to all economies, regardless of their level
of development. Next, we describe the equilibrium focusing rst on the early-bloomers
and then on the late-bloomers.
3 Early- and Late-Bloomers
We consider two types of economies: early- and late-bloomers. The former label corre-
sponds to advanced nations that have already reached the steady state. Late-bloomers,
in turn, denote underdeveloped countries that posses a capital labor ratio well below
the steady-state level; this could be, for example, a consequence of an increase in total
factor productivity due to the adoption of the early-bloomers institutions and policies.
To be more precise, suppose that all but one of our small-open countries have al-
ready reached the steady-state. Assume as well that all these early-blooming countries
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share the same endowments. In equilibrium, identical countries make the same choices.
So the equilibrium for these economies will be the same as the equilibrium for a single
large and closed economy, and it will not be a¤ected by the behavior of the small (still
developing) country. Therefore, their net exports equal zero and goods-market clearing
conditions (16) and (17) become
ct = Alctk

ctn

ct; (24)
xt = Blxtk

xtn

xt: (25)
On the steady-state equilibrium, early-bloomers diversify production, and variables
in per capita terms, relative employment of inputs and prices will remain invariant.
Denoting by an asterisk () steady-state outcomes, the consumersoptimality condi-
tion (4) implies that the interest rate in terms of investment goods at steady state is
exclusively pinned down by consumerspreferences:
rk = p
   1 +    1 : (26)
In addition, the appendix shows that the relative price is given by
p =
A
B
 


 

 
1  
1  
1   
B
 1+ 1
 
1 

(1  )+((1 ) (1 ))lx
(1  )
(1 ) (1 )
1 
n
(1 ) (1 )
1  : (27)
The result is quite intuitive. As c production becomes more protable than x man-
ufacturing because land is more abundant, the economy devotes relatively more re-
sources to the production of consumption goods, making investment products rel-
atively scarcer and, as a consequence, more expensive. It must be the case that
p = pmin(kc ;n

c) = p
max(kx;n

x); and that n

c > n

x and k

c < k

x by assumption.
These conditions will prove useful later in Section 4.5
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After describing the equilibrium in which advanced nations are located, we turn
to the late-bloomer. Consider the other small nation with the same land endowment
as the early bloomers that starts developing later with an initial capital stock k0 <
min fkc ; kxg, and is still moving along the adjustment path. This developing country
faces the steady-state relative output price obtained above for the developed world 
i.e., pt = p for all t. From here on, the asterisk () denotes the international diversied-
production equilibrium for the early-bloomers, whereas we remove the time subscript
to denote the steady state values for the less developed country.
Along the adjustment path, the small developing country will accumulate capital
until its domestic rate of return falls down to the rate rk, the one that prevails in the
rest of the world, because preferences are the same across nations.6 At the same time,
capital accumulation will bring an increase in the prices of the other two inputs, land
and labor. The pattern of production along the transition will be, in turn, determined
by expressions (10) and (11). In the steady-state diversied production equilibrium,
equations (7) to (9), and (26) imply that the long-run capital-labor ratio in the in-
vestment sector will equal the one of the rest of the world, kx = kx. This equality
and expressions (12) to (15) and (26) guarantee that, in the long run, international
factor-price equalization holds, and that the country will be using the same techniques
as the rest of the developed nations; that is, kc = kc , w = w
, nc = nc , nx = n

x and
rn = r

n.
4 Does the Timing of Development Matter?
Now, we answer the key question of whether the time when an economy starts its devel-
opment path towards the steady state a¤ects its long-run performance. Put di¤erently,
we ask whether the initial relative capital stock is a determinant of the long-run income
level in the model with land. For that purpose, it is interesting to briey recall why
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late-blooming nations can remain permanently poor in the more standard dynamic
Heckscher-Ohlin model.7
Suppose that land is not present in the model, that is,  =  = 0. Because
k0 < min fkc ; kxg, the developing nation starts its development path specialized in
c-goods production. From (5), this means that output per capita is given by yt = Akt .
As explained above, the economy will continue accumulating capital until rkt = rk,
which is pinned down by preferences. Notice that this equality will hold as soon as
k = kc , and that for this capital stock the specialization condition p
  pmin(k) will
hold because p = pmin(kc ). Hence, k < k
 2 (kc ; kx), and y < y.
To fully understand the reason, consider a late-bloomer that starts its development
path diversifying production with k0 2 (kc ; kx). This economy is already in long-run
equilibrium. It just needs to choose lx such that (1  lx)kc + lxkx = k0, and the return
to capital already equals the one of the rest of the world. But if k0 < k then y < y;
that is, the late bloomer remains permanently poorer.
Let us go back to our case, and consider strictly positive values of  and . In
the long-run, all economies regardless of their timing of development will face the
same equilibrium price p and the same interest rate rk. Suppose rst that the late-
bloomer is diversifying production at the steady state. The late-bloomer will end up
using the same production techniques as the rest of the world, ki = ki and ni = n

i
(i = c; x). In addition, because the developing economy has the same land endowment
as early-blooming nations, it will have the same long-run labor allocation, lc = lc , by
equilibrium conditions (19) and (21), and the same long-run income y by (22).
The only scenario in which the developing economy can remain permanently poorer
is, therefore, long-run specialization. Because k0 < min fkc ; kxg, the developing nation
starts its development path specialized in c-goods. Long-run international interest-rate
equalization means that rk = rk, and then k = k

c (n=n

c)
=(1 ) by (7). The issue is
whether this capital stock is consistent with the specialization condition p  pmin.
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Remember that we can write p = pmin(kc ;n

c) by (10). Hence, the last inequality
becomes pmin(kc ;n

c)  pmin(k;n), which implies that k  kc (n=nc)( )=( ). The
assumption that c-goods are more land intensive, in turn, implies that nct > nxt for
all t; as a result, n=nc < 1. Simple algebra, then, leads to the conclusion that the
two conditions for k are compatible if and only if  (1  )   (1  ). The same
assumption requires, however, that  (1  ) >  (1  ), which is a contradiction.
Therefore, the developing economy always enters the diversication cone before arriving
at long-run equilibrium and, because of that, converges to the income levels of the
identical early bloomers. All you need is that both types of nations that di¤er only in
the timing of development face the same prices at steady state.
5 Conclusion
The closed-economy neoclassical growth model predicts that welfare levels in nations
that share the same technologies and preferences should converge, and that the initial
physical capital stock should not be an important determinant of long-run income
levels. The dynamic two-sector Heckscher-Ohlin model, however, can challenge this
prediction: a late-blooming nation that starts its development process with a relatively
low capital stock can end up permanently poorer. We have shown that when land is
introduced in the latter framework two small open economies with identical land-labor
endowments will converge to the same long-run income independently of their timing
of development.
It is the property that land is in xed supply that drives this result. The innite
horizon framework of international trade and economic growth implies that the return
on capital in poor and rich countries is equalized at steady state. When land is not
present, this makes possible that a late-blooming economy with a lower capital stock
than the rest of the world reaches a long-run equilibrium in which it remains perma-
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nently poorer. The reason is that it can use the world-wide optimal techniques by
simply allocating more labor than rich nations to the less capital intensive activity.
Adding land as a factor of production, however, eliminates this possibility: a xed
supply of land implies that along the balanced-growth path identical economies have
to allocate the same amount of labor across activities.
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Notes
1Empirically, the conditional convergence hypothesis has performed surprisingly well. Starting
with the seminal work of Barro (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), it has been tested in
many instances, nding important support. In particular, after controlling for measures of education,
policies and institutions, poor areas tend to grow faster than rich ones.
2Land is an important production input. See Smith (1776), Schultz (1967), Galor and Weil (2000),
and Caselli and Coleman (2001), among many others.
3This is without loss of generality. It can be shown that our main results also hold if consumption
goods are less land intensive and/or more capital intensive than investment goods.
4Equation (10) [(11)] is obtained forcing prots of x-goods [c-goods] rms to be positive when
input prices are given by optimality conditions (7) to (9) for the c-goods [x-goods].
5An expression for y can be obtained from (22) using (19), (9), (29), (30) and (32).
6In numerical analysis of the model, we have found that, for a wide set of reasonable parameter
values, its transition is characterized by a one-dimensional stable saddle-path that implies that the
adjustment path is asymptotically stable and unique.
7See Chen (1992) and Atkeson and Kehoe (2000) for additional details.
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A Obtaining expression (27)
From (19), (20), (12) and (13), it is possible to write kt as a function of kxt and lxt:
kt = kxt

(1  lxt) (1     )
(1    ) + lxt

: (28)
From (19), (21), (14) and (15) it follows that
n = nxt

(1  lxt) (1     )
(1    ) + lxt

: (29)
It is also possible relating nxt and kxt. In particular, equation (7) implies that
nxt =
"
rkt
pt
k
(1 )
xt
B
#1=
: (30)
Using (25) and (7), we can write output of investment goods as a function of the
interest rate and capital, the resulting expression for investment output must satisfy
the steady state condition of (3):
k =
rk
p
lxk

x: (31)
Then using (28) we can solve for the steady state labor allocation in the investment
sector:
lx =
 (1     )
(1    ) ( 1   1) +  ((1  ) (1  )  ) : (32)
Substituting this result into (29) we can solve for nx, which yields from (29) and
(26) the value of kx. Finally, taking the resulting expressions for n

x and k

x into (23)
give (27).
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